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ABSTRACT
An Ënpirical Examination o f the Factor That Influence Venture Capital Investment
and the Location o f Fimds
by
Sandra Phillips Johnson
Dr. Nasser Daneshvary, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Economics 
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
Entrepreneurs who contribute to economic growth have looked to venture capital 
firms as a  major source o f financing. This thesis tests the sigm'fîcance o f explanatory 
variables for investment in venture capital at both the national and regional levels. The 
explanatory variables predicting national new investment in venture capital include 
capital gains tax rates, stock market pricing, risk premiums, and regulations on pension 
fund investment Further, this thesis examines whether the location o f venture capital 
funds depends on research and development funds at universities within a state, state 
corporate income tax burdens, state unemployment rates, and average weekly earnings 
witliin a state.
m
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION 
The venture capital industry has emerged as an important component o f 
America’s private equity m arket This market includes professional investment 
partnerships, such as venture capital firms, that acquire significant stock holdings of 
unregistered, private companies/ Venture capital paitnerships have provided hard-to- 
find financing for entrepreneurs. And, many entrepreneurs have been credited with 
fueling economic growth through the process o f technological irmovation.
Technological innovatiort as the Office o f the President noted, “is responsible for 
a significant portion o f the increases in the standard o f living.”  ̂ Indeed, Robert M. 
Solow, recipient of the 1987 Nobel Prize in economics, pointed to technological 
irmovation as a critical source o f a  country’s economic growth.^ Venture capital 
investment has funded iimovators such as Federal Express and many o f today’s leading
‘ George W. Fenn, Nellie Liang, and Stephen Prowse, The Economics o f the Private 
Eouitv Market (Wasfiington: Board o f Governors o f the Federal Reserve System, 1995), 
p. 5.
“ The State of Small Business: A Retmrt o f the President: 1994 (Washington: U. S. GPO, 
1995), p. 109.
 ̂Robert M. Solow, “Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function,” Review 
o f Economics and Statistics 39 (August 1957), pp. 312-320.
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high technology fîims, including Genetech, Microsoft and Intel. * What, then, are 
the economic Actors that impact this market?
Today’s formal venture capital investment industry evolved during the late 
sixties. Therefore, much o f the data necessary to study this industry covers a relatively 
brief time ftame. However, research on venture capital has identifted several economic 
variables thought to influence new investment flows. Minarik (1992), Proterba (1989), 
and Bygrave and Shulman ( 1988) have investigated the effects o f capital gains taxation 
on venture capital investment Studies have also examined the state o f stock markets for 
small-capitalized companies as an explanatory variable o f new venture capital 
investment^ Additionally, the venture capital industry has been studied from a regional 
perspective. Among others. Green (1991), Florida and Kenney (1988b), and Leinbach 
and Amrhein ( 1987) have studied regional patterns o f venture capital investment or high 
technolo^f location factors. Thefr research identified several Actors, mcluding mature 
financial centers and proximity to large research and development universities, as 
attractors o f venture capital to a state or regiotL
Although a wealA o f research has focused on venture capital, many questions 
remain regarding the effects o f capital gains taxation. The effects o f risk premiums on
* Richard L. Florida and Martin Kenney, “V arture Capital, H i^  Technology, and 
Regional Development,” Regional StuÆes 22.1 (1988), p. 33.
= William D. Bygrave and Joel E. Shulman, “Capital GaAs Tax: Bane or Boon for 
Venture Capital?”  Frontiers o f Entrenreneurship Research (W ellesI^, MA: Babson 
College Entrepreneurship ConArence, 1988)
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venture capital investment also merits empirical examinatioiL Further, a need exists for 
empirical scrutiny o f economic factors that influence the location o f venture capital 
fonds.
Our national legislators frequently engage in debate on the effects o f increases or 
decreases in capital gains tax rates upon businesses and economic growth. Empirical 
knowledge o f how such changes impact venture capital can lead to better informed 
decisions. In addition, with knowledge o f which economic factors in a state affect 
location and investment decisions o f the venture capital industry, state legislators can 
better plan for economic development
This study, therefore, examines national new investment in venture capital. It 
analyzes historical data from 1969 through 1995 to identify the effects o f interest rates, 
stock market performance, pension plan legislatiort and changes in capital gains tax rates 
on national venture capital investment In addition, it investigates how total venture 
capital within a state is influenced by corporate tax burdens, university research and 
development average weekly earnings, and unemployment rates. Data used for the 
regional analysis covers fifty states and the District o f Columbia between 1993 and 1995.
This paper is composed o f seven major sections. First the introduction provitks 
the background and purpose for this study. N ext a brief overview o f the venture capital 
industry is giveiL The third section reviews the literature and empirical analyses 
consulted for this stucty. The forth section presents the econometric models adopted for 
this analysis. Theit the data and methotfology used for this analysis are given in section 
five. Subsequently, section six presents the results ofthe econometric analyses. Finally, 
section seven (fetails the conclusions reached as a  result o f this stwfy.
Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER n
THE VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY 
Since its formal emergence in 1946, the venture capital industry has fluctuated 
between periods o f rapid expansion and periods o f sharp contractions. This industry 
boomed in the early- and mid-1960s, only to shrink dramatically from 1969 to the mid- 
1970s.® Venture capital investments surged again between the late 1970s and the 1980s. 
Then, after a brief downturn in the early nineties, venture capital investments grew to 
record levels o f $4.3 billion o f new investments in independent private firms during 
1995. In that same year, $37 billion in total funds was under management by the total 
venture capital industry.^ As Figure I shows, total funds under management by the 
venture capital industry have maintained an upward growth trend since 1983.*
® William D. Bygrave and Je ffry  A. Timmons, Venture Capital at the Crossroads 
(Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992), p. 21.
Venture Economics fovestor Services, Venture Economics Annual Review: 1996. ed. 
Ray Lam (New York: Securities Data Publishing 1996), pp. 4 ,15.
* Total fimds under management include funds invested by venture capital firms mto 
portfolio firms as well as new investment funds received by venture capital firms.
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Figure I. Venture capital industry resources; 1983-1995
When stuctying the (fynamics o f venture capital investment, it is helpful to 
understand the industry structure, the roles o f its key players, and the manner in which 
fimds are invested and returns distributed. An understanding o f the basic characteristics 
ofthe venture capital industry can lead to more accurate predictions on its responses to 
changes in economic variables.
This chapter will provide a brief overview o f the venture capital industry. First, 
the history o f venture capital investment will be reviewed. Next, the structure o f the 
venture capital industry will be discussed, with an emphasis
on independent private firms. And finally, the cycle o f venture capital investment will be 
examined.
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History o f the Venture Capital Industry in the United States 
The origins o f today’s venture capital industry in the US can be traced back to the 
founding o f American Research and Development (ARD) in Massachusetts in 1946/
This organization o f MTT colleagues formed with the objective of investing in emerging 
ventures. Its investment o f approximately $70 thousand in Digital Eqm'pment Company 
(DEC) in 1957 reaped manifold returns when the firm went public in I960. When DEC 
shares were offered to the public through an initial public offering (IPO), ARD’s shares 
rose in value firom $25 per share to $74.10 per share. The success o f ARD’s investment 
in DEC fueled growth in the venture capital industry in the 1960s and 1970s.
A major offshoot o f ARD’s success was the establishment o f small business 
investment corporations (SBICs) by the US Small Business Administration (SBA). In 
1958, SBICs were established to create pools o f capital for the development and 
formation o f new v en tu re s .T h e  SBICs were licensed and regulated by the government 
and were able to provide four-to-one leveraging for loans to emerging small businesses. 
They were at the forefi’ont o f the venture capital industry’s early expansion and grew to 
approximately 700 firms by the mid-1960s.
However, a  stock-market downturn in late 1969, along with recessionary 
pressures and Vietnam-War related tax increases almost yielded a deathblow to the 
SBICs. SBIC-funded new ventures, financed by debt as opposed to equity, faltered as 
their cash flows failed to support debt payments. Their troubles led to new SBA 
regulations that reduced the number o f SBICs in the progranL The influence o f SBICs
’william D. Bygrave and Je ffry  A. Timmons, Venture Capital at the Crossroads 
(Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992), pp. 17-19.
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has continued to wane in the venture capital world. SBIC gross loans and investments 
outstanding for the 1990 fiscal year totaled only $2.6 billioiL^  ̂ In comparison, private 
venture capital firms, exclusive o f SBICs, managed $24,139 billion during the same 
calendar year.
Researchers have credited several Actors for Ae emergence o f private venture 
capital firms as Ae dominant segment o f Ae industry. One such A ctor identified by 
Fenn, Liang, and Prowse was A e organizational innovation o f a limited partnership 
s tructure .This irmovation reduced information search costs and risk for mexperienced 
investors in venture capital. These improvements were accomplished by parAering 
mexperienced mvestors wiA experienced venture capital firms that could make better 
selections o f entrepreneurial firms m which to buy equity holdings. Venture capital 
firms, Aerefore, can be viewed as financial mtermediaries between inexperienced 
mvestors and entrepreneurial firms. Yuk-Shee Chan also identifies venture capital firms 
as financial intermediaries who can reduce information and search costs."
Additionally, Fenn, Liang, and Prowse cited changes in legislation regarding 
pension fiduciaries as an augmenting influence on mdustry growA.‘̂  For example, Ae
Bygrave and Timmons, Venture Capital at A e Crossroads ( 1992L p. 21.
' ‘ SBIC Program Statistical Package, ed. John WilmeA (Washington: LF. S. Small 
Business Administration, 1993), p. 26.
Venture Economics Investor Services, Venture Economics Annual Review: 1996. ed. 
Ray Lam (New Yoric Securities Data Publishing, 1996), p. 6.
"  George W. Fenn, Nellie Liang, and Stephen Prowse, The Economics o f  Ae Private 
Equity Market (Washington: Board o f Governors o f  Ae Federal Reserve System, 1995), 
p. 4.
M Chan, Yuk-Shee, “On A e Positive Role o f Financial AtermeAation in Allocation o f 
Venture Capital m a Maricet wiA hnperfoct Information,” The Journal OfFinance 38.5 
(December 1983), pp. 1543-1568.
Fenn, Lian^ and Prowse (1995), pp. 13-14.
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“Prudent Man” Rule o f 1979 altered A e Employment Retirement Acome Security Act 
(ERISA) by allowmg pension managers to invest m Agher-risk instruments such as 
venture capital. A  addition, A e “Safe Harbor” Regulation for ERISA m 1980 removed 
A e fiduciary role for venture capital firms that accepted pension fimds as limited 
partners.
The rate o f taxation on capital gains is also Aought to influence mvestment m 
venture capital. Dworsky hypoAesized that reductions m capital gains taxation led to 
mcreases venture capital mvestment*® A sum, many factors have been cited as 
contributing to A e rise o f mdependent private venture capital firms to a predominant 
position m A e venture capital mdustry mcludmg: limited partnersAp structures; relaxed 
regulations for pension fiduciaries; and capital gains tax reductions.
Structure o f Ae Venture Capital Industry 
Today’s venture capital industry is composed o f three major types of investment 
firms. These categories mclude mdependent private firms, corporate mdustrial groups, 
and venture capital subsidiaries o f financial corporations.*^ However, as seen m Figure 
2, mdependent private firms have emerged as A e dommant sector of tAs industry. 
Because o f A eir dominant position m Ae industry, as well as A e avAlability o f data.
*® Alan J. Dworsky, “The Case for Raismg Ae Capital Gains Tax: Undomg Ae Damage 
From Venture Capital,”  Financial Analysts Journal (MarcAApril 1986), pp. 69-70.
Stanley E. Pratt, “The Organized VetAue Capital Community,” Pratt’s Gmde to 
Venture Capital Resources, ed. Ted Weissberg (New York: Securities Data PublisAng, 
1995), p. 91.
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independent private firms are evaluated in this study. The major characteristics of 
mdependent private firms are detailed in this sectiorr
Venture Capital Adustry Segments
Corporate 
Financial 
16%
Corporate
Independent
1%
Independent
Private
83%
.Shurre- Vennge Fconomie» TnveWor Service» 1996
Figure 2. Venture capital industry segments in 1995
Adependent Private Firms
Adependent private firms represent Ae major source o f organized venture capital 
fimds.** Between 1969 and 1995, Aese firms experienced Agh variability m inflows o f 
new finds from investors. The paA o f new mvestment to independent private firms is 
exhibited m Figure 3.
18 Pratt (1995), p. 92.
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Annual New Investment Fbws to Adependent Venture Capital
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Figure 3. New mvestment m independent private firms: 1969-1995
Adependent private firms controlled 83 percent o f Ae $37 billion under 
management m Ae venture capital mdustry for 1995.*’ One segment o f tAs category is 
composed of family groups such as Ae Rockefellers, PApps, and Whitney organizations. 
Adependent private firms Aso mclude professional parAersAps that mvest fimds 
received fi’om pensions, major corporations, mdviduals and fAnilies, endowments and 
foundations, insurance firms, and fi)reign investors.
Pension fimds were Ae largest source o f new mvestment fiows to mdependent 
private firms durmg 1995. Pensions provided approximately SI .656 billion, or 38 
percent of Ae $4.227 billion total of new inflows to mdependent private firms m 1995.“
*’  Venture Economics Investor Services, Venture Economics Annual Review: 1996. ed. 
Ray Lam (New York: Securities Data PublisAng, 1996), p. 7.
“  Venture Economics Investor Services (1996), p. 15.
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Endowments and foundations were the next laigest source of new venture investment 
flows, committing 23 percent o f total new fimds in 1995. Insurance companies, 
mdividuals and families, and corporations provided approximately 19 percent, 18 
percent, and 2 percent respectively o f 1995 new funds for independent private firms. 
Figure 4 provides a  grapAcal summary o f Ae sources o f new venture capital inflows to 
mdependent private firms in 1995.
Sources ofNew Investment Flows to 
Independent Private Finns in 1995
Corporations
2X
Endowments 
23%
Individuals 
18%
Source: Wnturc Economics Investor SErvices, 1996
Figure 4. Sources o f new investment m venture capital
The Venture Capital Investment Process 
Adependent private firms act as financiA and management mterme Aaries 
between entrepreneurs seeAng capitA and investors seekmg new, Agh-retum 
investments. Bygrave and Shulman identify three major stakeholders m Ae venture
Reproduced with permission o fthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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capital process; limited partners, general partners, and portfolio firms.
Limited partners consist o f inAviduals and families, pension fimds, corporations, 
insurance companies, foreigners, and endowments and foundations. They invest fimds 
wiA venture capital firms. Next, venture capital firms, acting as general partners, use 
A eir business and management expertise to identify entrepreneuriA firms wiA Agh- 
growA prospects. Equity positions are Aen purchased from selected entrepreneurs or 
portfolio companies. A grapAcA representation o f tAs mvestment process is presented 
in Figure 5.
The Venture Capital Investment Process
LIMITED PARTNERS
laiBvidnii, PcnaioB Fmidik 
toipaalioai. SofcigMB, and 
Endow nxnt» tn d
invantFundt
GENERAL
PARTNERS
tnde^oidcnt Pimic Fbnt
Pu re h n Eqütÿy 
Stan» !
PORTFOLIO
COMPANIES
Entjrprenrm»
MHnisialnvMtDni
RMinwlolnwMn
INITIAL PUBLIC 
OFFERINGOR L 
MERGER/
ACQUISmON
Sfeam id d  to the pnbOc 
prodedng gpitai pdm
\
'I
Figure 5. An overview o f Ae venture capitA mvestment process
WflKam D. Bygrave and Joel E. Shulman, “CapitA Gains Tax: Bane or Boon for 
Venture CapitA?”  Frontiers o f EntrepreneursAp Research (Well^lQf, MA: Babson 
College EntiepreneursAp Conference, 1988), p. 324.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
13
Many entrepreneurs tend to obtain equity financing fi:om venture capital firms as 
opposed to debt financing. As Fenn, Lian& and Prowse noted, debt financing is usually 
not an Atemative for entrepreneurs due to Ae Agh degree o f risk associated wiA Aeir 
busmess ventures.^ FurAer, new ventures tend to require a  Agher degree o f mteraction 
wiA experienced mvestors tAm is normally provided tAough debt financing.
Avestors m venture capitA earn their returns tAough A e appreciation o f Aeir 
sliares m A e portfolio compames as opposed to Avidend mcome. The appreciated 
vAue, or capitA gain, is realized when Ae portfolio company advances to A e inAA 
public ofiërmg (IPO) stage. Under an IPO a portfolio firm, wAch has been privately 
owned, registers wiA Ae Securities and Exchange Commission and “accesses Ae public 
capitA market tA o i^  Ae sAe o f securities.”^  However, a  Agh degree o f risk is 
associated wiA a new venture successfully reacAng Ae IPO stage. Alternately, venture 
mvestors may have A eir appreciated shares purchased tAough private mergers or as 
acqmsitions by oAer firms.
Phillips and Kirchhoff tested Ae old adage A at “four out o f five new firms fail 
witAn Ae first five years.”^̂  Their resAts yielded a  lower percentage-three out o f five 
new firms— neverAeless, posing a  Agh degree o f uncertainty for mvestors in new 
ventures. TAs Agh (Agree o f risk associated wiA venture capitA mvestment leads Ae
“  George W. Ferm, NeAe Liang, and Stephen Prowse, The Econormcs o f A e Private 
Equity Market (Washington: Board o f Governors ofthe FedecA Reserve System, 1995),
p. 18.
SeA C. Anderson, T. Randolph Beard, and J e ff i^  A. Bom, Initial Publie Offerings 
(Boston: Kluwer Acadermc Publishers, 1995), p. 1.
Bruce D. Phillips and Bruce A. Kirchhoff “Formation, Growth, and SurvivA; Small 
Fum Dynamics m A e U. S. Economy,” Small Busmess Economics 1 (1989), pp. 65-74.
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typically risk-averse investor to require a  higher return &om such investments. 
Indeed, high returns are not unusual for this industry. To illustrate. Venture Economics 
cited returns at ‘̂ astronomical levels o f I year ERR o f 54.2% for funds formed during 
1969-1995.”^  Such performance levels bode well for the continued growth o f the 
venture capital industry.
^  Venture Economics Investor Services, Venture Economics Annual Review: 1996. ed. 
Ray Lam (New York: Securities Data Publishing, 1996), p. 43.
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CHAPTER m
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Economic research on the venture capital industry has expanded over the last 
three decades, concurrent with the industry’s growth. Most empirical studies have 
examined venture capital investment from 1969 onward, due to availability o f data 
covering that period. Literature reviewed in this section falls into two categories; (I) 
studies of the economic variables predicted to afreet national investment in venture 
capital, (2 ) and regional studies of the impact o f locational and economic factors on 
venture capital.
This section will first present summaries o f previous research and opinions 
regarding the effect o f capital gains taxation on investment and the attendant implications 
for national venture capital investment Subsequently, research examining the 
relationship between venture capital investment and variables such as stock market 
indices, interest rates, and the market for public offerings will be reviewed. Finally, the 
chapter will conclude with a review o f regional and state economic conditions thought to 
influence both venture capital location and investment activity.
15
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Capital Gains Taxation 
The tax rate on long-term capital gains changed several times between 
1969 and 1995, the period under consideration for this study. Long-term capital gains are 
defined as the appreciation on assets held by investors for more than 6  months up until 
1976, and greater than 12 months thereafter. Jane Gravelle icfentified the following 
major movements o f the maximum individual tax rate on long-term capital gains; an 
increase from 25 percent to 48 percent in 1969; a  reduction to 28 percent in 1978; a 
further reduction to 20 percent in 1981; an increase to 33 percent in 1986; and a decrease 
to 28 percent in 1990. “
The literature expressed dichotomous opinions on the response o f investment in 
venture capital to these tax rate changes. Some argued that increases in the marginal tax 
rate on capital gains would lead to significant reductions in venture capital investments. 
Yet, others posited minimal responses in venture capital investment due to changes in 
capital gains taxation. A key argument against rate hikes on capital gains taxes centered 
on the tendentty o f investors to hold appreciated equity in order to defer the payment o f 
taxes on the appreciated value-the “lock-in” effect
The “Lock-in” Effect o f Capital Gains Taxation 
Capital gains are not taxed until the appreciated equity is sold. Because o f this 
interest-firee deferment o f taxation, investors are motivated to retain less than optimal 
stocks, which have appreciated over time. John C. Goodman, president and CEO for the
“  Jane G. Gravelle, “History o f Capihil Gains Taxation,” The Economic Effects o f 
Taxing Capital Income (Cambridge; MET Press, 1994), pp. 268-71.
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National Center for Policy Analysis, noted “Since selling is taxed and possessii^ is not, 
high capital gains taxes encourage investors to hold rather than sell-thereby avoiding the 
tax indefinitely.”^  Goodman’s view was echoed by Auerbach, who noted the “lock-in” 
effect distorted efficiency in portfolio management Consequently, if  portfolio firms 
represented more efficient investment alternatives, the “lock-in” effect would impede the 
fiows o f investment dollars to venture capital.
Auten, Burman, and Randolph reviewed nine empirical studies which had 
evaluated the “lock-in” effect by estimating how sales o f appreciated equity, or capital 
gains realizations, responded to changes in capital gains taxation."^ These studies yielded 
estimates, presented in Table 1 below, for the elasticity o f capital gains realizations to 
changes in the marginal tax rates on the appreciation o f investments held for more than 
six months
John C. Goodman, “The Case for a Capital Gains Tax Cut,” Capital Gains Tax Reform 
and hvestment in Small Business. United States House ofRepresentatives: Committee 
on Small Business (Washington: GPO, 1995), p. 49.
^  Alan J. Auerbach, “On the Design and Reform o f Capital Gains Taxation,”  American 
Economic Association Papers and Proceedings (May 1992), p. 263.
^  Gerald E. Auten, Leonard E. Burman, and William C. Randolph, “Estimation and 
foterpretation o f Capital Gams Realization Behavior: Evidence From Panel Data,” 
National Tax Journal 4 2 3  (September 1989), pp. 353-74.
^  Long-term gains were defined as appreciation on securities held a t least six months up 
until 1976. After 1976, securities held for at least one year qualified for long-term gains 
tax treatment
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
18
Table I. Long-Term Capital Gains Realization Elasticities
Studies Data Type Capital Gams Type ReaUzation Elasticity
Feldstein, Slemrod, and 
Yttzhaki{l980)
Cross-Section, High- 
Income Sample; 1973
Corporate Stocks -3.75
VCnarik(198I) Cross-Section, High- 
Income Sample, 1983
Corporate Stocks Range &om -0.44 to 
-0.79
Auten and Gotfèlter 
(1982)
Panel Data, NGddle- 
Income Sample, 
1967 to 1973
AU Capital Assets Short-Run Range: -0.91 
to -3.46 
Long-Run Range: 
-0.36 to -1.45
U. S. Treasury (1985) Panel Data, 
1971 to 1975
AU Capital Assets 
Corporate Stocks
Long-Run Range: 
-1.16 to -2.20
Long-Run: -2.07
U. S. Treasury (1985) Time Series, 
1954 to 1985, 
An Taxpayers
AU Capital Assets Short-Run: - U  
Long-Run: -0.8
Lindsey (1987) Pooled Cross-Section and 
Time Series,
1965 to 1982
AU Capital Assets •Short-Run: -2.14 
•Long-Run: -1.37
Darby, CHUingham, and 
Greenlees (1988)
Time Series, 
1954 to 1985, 
AU Taxpayers
AU Capital Assets •Long-Run Range: 
-0.62 to -1.51
Congressional Budget 
Ofl5ce(I988)
Time Series, 
1954 to  1985, 
AH Taxpayers
AU Capital Assets •Range from -0.79 to 
-0.99
Auerbach (1988) Time Series, 
1954 to 1986. 
AU Taxpayers
AU Capital Assets •Long-Run Range: 
-0.06 to —1.08
♦Derived at 25.4% average tax.
Source: Auten, Burman, and Randolph (1989) National Tax Journal. 355
The studies predicted from a .06 percent to almost a four percent decrease in 
capital gains realizations when the marginal tax rate increased by one percent hi other 
words, a one percent increase in the rate o f capital gains taxation could, at most, result in 
up to a four percent decrease in sales o f  appreciated equities by investors. Moreover, 
even though researchers debated the magnitude o f the lock-in effect, they generally found 
that increases in capital gains taxation could distort optimai portfolio decisions.
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Although Auten, Bunnan, and Randolph examined all mvestments,^^ not venture capital 
investment specifically, one could hypothesize that the lock-in effect might prevent funds 
from freely flowing into venture capital.
Capital Gains Taxes and Investment Returns 
Some researchers also considered the depressing effects o f such increased capital 
gains taxes on investment in stocks, which paid returns only through appreciation of 
equity. Bygrave and Timmons noted, “Within the venture capital industry, it is almost 
universally believed that the federal capital gains tax rate is the most important influence 
on the flows o f venture capital.”^̂  Similarly, Rahn attributed a  large drop in venture 
capital investment to the capital gains tax increase from 20  percent to 28 percent in 
1986.̂  ̂ He characterized the capital gains tax as “a direct levy on investment and 
entrepreneurship, punishing and discouraging these activities.” ^
Dworslty presented another viewpoint on the effects o f capital gains tax rate cuts 
and venture capital investment He argued that lower capital gains tax rates resulted in 
inefficient over-investment in venture capital funds. Dworsky noted the huge increases
Gerald E. Auten, Leonard E. Burman, and William C. Randolph, “Estimation and 
Interpretation o f Capital Gains Realization Behavior Evidence From Panel Data,” 
National Tax Journal 423 (September 1989), pp. 353-74.
Bygrave and Tumnons, Venture Capital at the Crossroarfe (1992). p. 262.
^  Richard W. Rahn, “Capital Gains Taxes and the Investment Impact on Small 
Business,” Congressional Testimony before the Committee on Small Busmess: United 
States House ofRepresentatives (Internet, February 22,1995), p. 2.
^  Rahn (1995), p. 18- 
Alan J. DworAqr, “The Case for Raising the Capital Gains Tax: Undoing the Damage 
From Venture Capital,” Financial Analysts Journal (March/Aprü 1986), pp. 69-71.
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in venture capital funds from $39 million m 1977 to $11.5 billion in 1983.“  He 
contended that such heated investment produced declines in share values and investor 
losses because more new firms were created than the market could accommodate.
Other studies, however, have countered that capital gains taxes play no role in 
venture capital investment Minarik found it unlikely that capital gains tax rate increases 
deterred entrepreneurs from forming new businesses.^^ He stated, ”An entrepreneur who 
believes that he has a million-dollar idea is unlikely to hold back because the capital 
gains rate is 28 percent instead o f 22 p e r c e n t W h e n  he examined the influence o f 
individual investor responses to capital gains taxation, he cited estimates that over 85 
percent o f formal venture capital was received from investors who were not subject to 
capital gains taxes including; endowments and foundations, foreign investors, and 
pension funds.
These assertions are supported by Proterba’s research, which evaluated data on 
the capital structure o f start-up firms, sources o f venture capital, average tax rates on 
venture capital, and annual start-up activity.”  This study examined venture IPOs and 
realized capital gains to assess whether the statutory increase on capital gains tax rates in 
1986 had diminished investment funding for new ventures. After analyzing data over the 
period o f 1977 - 1988, Proterba concluded that the increase in marginal tax rates on 
capital gains for individuals did not have a major effect on the availability o f  investment
“  Dworslty (1986), p. 69.
”  Joseph J. Minarik, “Capital Gains Taxation, Growth, and Fairness,” Cdntemporarv 
Policy Issues 10.3 (July 1992), p. 20.
“  Minarik (Juty 1992), p. 20.
”  James M. Proterba, “Capital Gams Tax Polity Toward Entrepreneurship,”  National 
Tax Journal 42.3 (September 1989), pp. 375-389.
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funds for new ventures.'^ This conclusion was based on finding that corporations, tax- 
exempt investors, and foreign investors who were not subject to individual capital gains 
tax rates contributed the majority o f venture capital funding.
Therefore, competing views are presented by the literature on the effects of 
capital gains tax rate changes on venture capital investment One bocty o f research 
predicts marked decreases in venture capital investment in response to increases in the 
capital gains tax rate. Another body o f literature predicts little or no response in venture 
capital investment when capital gains tax rates are increased.
Venture Capital Investment and Financial Markets 
Econometric studies o f new investment in venture capital have also included 
financial market variables. Bygrave and Shulman conducted empirical tests on annual 
variables expected to influence investment flows into venture capital fimds.^' They 
analyzed 18 years o f annual data from 1969 to 1987. The variables evaluated included; 
the S&P 500 and NASDAQ indexes, short- and long-term Treasury issues, a dummy 
variable for rate changes in capital gains taxes, and total dollar volumes o f IPOs. The 
stock market indices and IPO level variables were chosen because rising stock index 
values were projected to lead to better prospects for IPOs, thereby increasing returns to 
venture capital investors. The stock market indices and IPO variables were expected to 
positively influence investment flows into venture capital funds.
"  Proterba (1989), p. 379.
William D. Bygrave and Joel E. Shulman, “Capital Gains Tax: Bane or Boon for 
Venture Capital?” Frontiers o f Entrepreneurship Research (Wellesley, MA: Babson 
College Entrepreneurship Conference, 1988), pp. 327-335.
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Short-term Treasury bills and long-term Treasury bonds were predicted to have 
two directions o f influence on venture capital investment I f  th ^  were viewed as “risk­
free alternatives to investments in venture capital flmds,” ~̂ venture capital investments 
could be expected to decrease when returns on Treasury bills or bonds increased. Bodie, 
Kane, and Marcus also identify the risk premium as an important variable when 
analyzing portfolio choice."*  ̂ On the other hand, if  the rates on Treasuries were viewed as 
the cost o f debt for entrepreneurs, venture capital investments could be expected to 
increase when return rates on Treasury bills and Treasury bonds increased.
The capital gains tax dummy was set to zero for high-tax years (1970-1977, 1986, 
and 1987) and set to one for low-tax years (1969, 1978-1985).^ These dummy values 
reflected increases in the rate o f capital gains taxation from 25 percent to 48 percent in 
1970, decreases in the rate to 28 percent in 1978, and increases in the rate to 33 percent 
in 1986. After correcting for serial correlation with the Hildreth-Lu technique, removing 
insignificant variables (IPO values), and eliminating variables with high multicollinearity 
(S&P 500 index. Treasury bills, and Treasury bonds). Bygrave and Shulman reached 
several findings.
First, the lagged NASDAQ index variable was the only statistically significant 
variable identified by this esthnafioiL The coefiicient for the capital gains tax dummy
Bygrave and Shulman (1988) 327.
^  Zvi Bodie, Alex Kane, and Alan J. Marcus. Investments (Boston: Lwin, 1989), pp. 130- 
140. See Appendix A for further discussion on this theory.
^  Bygrave and Shulman designated 1969 and 1978-1985 as lower-tax years and set the 
dummy variable to one durmg these years.
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was statistically insignificant In addition, the coefficient on the dummy variable for 
capital gains tax rate changes multiplied by the lagged NASDAQ index, was 
insignificant Bygrave and Shulman then concluded the evidence failed to support 
predictions that increases in the capital gains tax rate would significantly reduce new 
investment in venture capital/^ Instead, the value o f the NASDAQ index, lagged by one 
year, was viewed as the most influential variable for predicting new venture capital 
investment They cautioned, however, that the statistically insignificant results for the 
capital gains tax variable were not conclusive, and proposed that the relative importance 
o f capital gains taxation on venture capital investment might be overstated by popular 
opinion.^
Regional o r State Influences on Venture Capital Investment 
Venture capital investment has also been studied from a geographic viewpoint 
The body o f literature has identified characteristics o f agglomeration in the location 
decisions o f venture capital firms at a regional and state level. This section will first 
review research that focused on regional concentration tendencies in venture capital 
investment fi:om a basic statistical or geographical viewpoint N ext literature will be 
reviewed which applied econometric analysis to conditions in states or regions to 
determine the economic variables tiiat influence location decisions o f  venture capital 
firms.
45 Bygrave and Shulman (1988) 335. 
“  Bygrave and Shulman (1988) 335.
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Regional Agglomeration Tendencies 
Researchers have noted that venture capital activities are concentrated by region 
and within states. Both the location o f venture capitalists and the location o f venture 
capital investment in portfolio firms tend towards agglomération. During the early 
1970s, Milford B. Green observed a  concentration o f venture capital firms within large 
urban areas with mature financial centers.^^ These early firms had spatial monopolies, 
which eroded over time as new venture capitalists and new investment opportunities in 
portfolio firms increased.
Green submitted that, over time, venture capitalists tended to develop market 
niches. These niches evolved around characteristics that concurrently influenced 
location and portfolio investment decisions. For example, when a venture capital firm 
chose to locate in a specific city, the types o f firms seeking venture financing in that area 
would constrain the choice o f industry in which investment dollars could be fmmeled. 
Alternately, if  the venture capital firm sought to invest in a particular industry, its choice 
o f location would be constrained by the location o f entrepreneurial firms in that 
industry.^ Additionally, he noted that independent private venture capital firms were 
inclined towards investment in high-technology firms.”  Thus, the location o f venture 
capital activities is related to the economic activity mix within the region.
Milford B. Green, “Preferences for US Venture Capital Investment: 1970-1988,” 
Venture Capital: hitemational Comparisons, ed., Milfi*rd B. Green (New York: 
Routledge, 1991), p. 23.
”  Underlying these choices was the requirement for close mteraction and therefore, 
physical proximity, between venture capital firms and their portfolio companies.
 ̂Green included SBICs in his analysis and analyzed the difference in investment 
choices between private venture capitalists and SBICs.
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The presence o f h i^ te c h n o lo ^  firms is also considered an influence on location 
decisions for venture capital firms. Florida and Kermey identified two major locational 
characteristics o f venture capital firms: (1) concentration in financial centers and; (2 ) 
concentration near high-technologr firms. ̂  Using data on the sixty-one most active 
venture capital firms in 1985, th ^  identified three major complexes. These major 
complexes, including California, New York, and New England, were each described as 
controlling greater than 15 percent o f the $16.3 billion total U. S. venture capital pool in 
1985. Two minor complexes, Texas and the Midwest were found to individually control 
between 5 to 15 percent o f total venture capital resources.** New York and Chicago 
were identified as mature financial centers that attracted venture capital resources. An 
extensive level o f high-technology activity, likely to attract venture capital distinguished 
California and New England. Indeed, Florida, Smith, and Sechoka found that 50 percent 
o f venture capital investment during 1986 went to the states o f California and 
Massachusetts.*^ Hence, the presence o f mature financial centers and high technolo@r 
firms are regional factors theorized to influence the location o f venture capital resources 
and investment
An additional economic foctor considered likely to influence the location 
decisions o f venture capital firms is the presence o f large Research and Development 
(R&D) universities. Leinbach and Amrhein noted the relationship between venture
*** Richard L. Florida and Martin Kenney, “Venture Capital, Technology, and
Regional Development,” Regional Studies 22.1 (1988), pp. 33-48.
** Florida and K enn^ (1988) 37.
*̂  Richard Florida, Donald F. Smith, Jr., and Elizabeth Sechoka, “Regional Patterns o f 
Venture Capital Investment,” Venture Capital: International Comoarisons. ed. M ilford B. 
Green (New York: Routledge, 1991), pp. 102-133.
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capital activity and the presence o f large research universities withm a state or region.** 
They cited the proximity o f MTT, Cal-Tech, and Stanford universities as dominant factors 
in attracting the lion’s share o f U. S. venture capital resources to Massachusetts and 
California. The influence o f R&D activity on location decisions o f high technolo^ 
firms, and therefore, venture capital firms, is examined in the next section o f this paper.
Empirical Studies o f Regional Location Decisions 
Since high technology firms were cited as attractors o f venture (apital activity, 
literature regarding market factors that attract high technolo^ firms to regions or cities 
was also consulted Acs, FitzRoy, and Smith conducted empirical studies o f  the 
relationship between university research and development (R&D) spillovers and high 
technology employment in 37 American cities.*^ They proposed that university research 
generated innovative knowledge which spread through personal interactions to local high 
technology firms, and that university R&D provided a an experienced pool o f trained 
labor for high technology firms. These factors, they argued, might influence the location 
decisions o f high technolo^ firms.
Based upon the empirical results, Acs, FitzRoy, and Smith concluded that a 
positive and statistically significant relationship existed between high technology 
employment and university R&D expenditures within a given location. ̂ * Additionally,
** Thomas R. Leinbach and Carl Amrhein, “A Geography o f the Venture Capital hidustry 
m the U. S ” Professaonal Geographer 39.2 (1987), p. ISO.
** Zoltan J. Acs, Felix R. FitzRoy, and Ian Smith, “ffigh Technolosr Employment, Wages 
and University R&D Spillovers: Evidence From U. S. Cities,” Frontiers o f 
Entrepreneurship Research (1995), pp. 274-285.
** Acs, FitzRoy, and Smith (1995) 281.
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they found a statistically significant and positive relationship between wages and high 
technology employment This result was counter to the expected direction o f influence 
for wages. However, the aufliors posited fliat die specialized skills required for the h i^  
technolosf industry might lead to a shortage o f workers in the area. This shortage could 
then require higher bids for wages to attract and retain specialized workers.
Herzog and Schlottman also mcamined the location of high technology
employment from the viewpoint o f worker mobility and location factors which attracted
high technoloQf workers to certain Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in the U. S.“
Although this empirical analysis focused on the fectors influencing choice o f residence
for skilled workers, it did emphasize underlying conditions that impact the location
decisions o f high technology firms. Specifically, Herzog and Schlottman noted that
In fact although such surveys and case studies show high technology 
firms to be “footloose” in terms o f the more traditional location factors 
(such as market access and transportation), they also provide evidence 
that these firms are dominated in their location decision by their ability 
to obtain and retain individuals with specific technical, scientific, and 
engineering skills.**
Summary
This review o f research on venture capital investment first summarized the bo<fy 
o f literature regarding factors that could mfluence the national level o f new investment in 
venture capital. The marginal rate o f taxes on capital gains, and its effect on venture 
capital investment, has been widely discussed One bocty of research predicted (fecreases
*® Henry W. Herzog, Jr. and Alan M. Schlottman, “Metropolitan Dimensions o f High- 
Tecbnolo^ Location in the U. S.: Woriter Mobility and Resicfence Choice,” Industry 
Location and Public Policy (1988L dp. 169-189.
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m venture capital investment due to increases in capital geins taxation. This effect was 
expected because o f  the nature o f venture capital investment returns. Since returns on 
venture capital are based purely on appreciation, the total return would be subject to 
capital gains taxes.
In contradiction, another body o f research predicted little or no effect on national 
venture capital investment due to increases in capital gains taxation. This opposing 
research noted that most investors in venture capital enjoyed a tax-free status. Instead, 
pension legislation, which relaxed restrictions on venture capital investment by pension 
fiduciaries, was considered key to fueling new investment in venture capital.
Empirical research identified the state o f the stock market for small equities as a  
significant statistical influence on national venture capital investment Specifically, the 
NASDAQ index was found to be statistically significant for predicting new investment in 
venture capital. Capital gains taxes did not exhibit a statistically significant influence, 
although the r^earchers concluded that the effect of capital gains taxation on venture 
capital investment could not be wholly discounted
A second bo<ty o f literature on regional location decisions for venture capital 
investment was also reviewed. Agglomeration tendencies for the venture capital 
industries were noted in regions or states with mature financial centers, and in locations 
where high technolo^ firms were present Additionally, researchers cited the proximity 
o f large R&D universities as a  locational attractor for h i^  technology firms.
The regional econometric studies reviewed found a  statistically significant 
relationship between high technology employment and university R&D mqwnditutes
** Herzog, Jr. and Schlottman (1988), 169.
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within a given location. Inasmuch as venture capital location decisions were considered 
to be influenced by the presence o f high technology firms, the underlying presence of 
large R&D universities would be considered an economic fector attracting venture 
capital to a  region or state.
Summaries o f the literature reviewed on new investment in venture capital and on 
the regional location o f venture capital funds are presented below in Table 2 and Table 3.
Table 2. Literature Summary: New Investment in Venture Capital
Hypothesis
1. Capital gains taxes distort 
efiBdency in portfolio 
management
Auerbach
(1992)
Auten, 
Berman, & 
Randolph 
(1989)
Goodman
(1995)
2. Capital ^ in s  tax rate increases 
lead to  drops in venture capital 
investment
Bygrave &
Shulman
(1988)
Bygrave&
Timmons
(1992)
Rahn (1995)
3. Capital gains tax rate 
decreases create ineffident 
overinvestment in venture 
capital
Dworsky
(1986)
4. Capital gains taxes have no 
significant effect on venture 
capital investment
M m arik(l992) Proterba
(1989)
S. Stock market performance is a 
predictor o f venture capital 
mvestment
Bygrave &
Shulman
(1988)
Bygrave &
Timmons
(1992)
6. Investor’s portfolio choices 
are influenced by risk 
premiums, tastes, and 
variances.
Bodie, Kane, 
& Marcus 
(1989)
Bygrave&
Shulman
(1988)
Chan(1983)
7. Relaxed pension legislation 
(ERISA) increased venture 
capital mvestment
Bygrave &
Shulman
(1988)
Fenn,Lian&&
Prowse(I995)
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Table 3 Literature Summary: Regional Location o f  Venture Capital Funds
Hypothesis
1. Venture capital finns locate FIorida& FlorWa, Smith, Green (1991)
nearm ature o r large Kenney (1988) & Sechoka
financial centers. (1991)
2. Venture capital &ms locate Florida & Florida, Smith, Green (1991)
near high technology &ms. Kenney (1988) & Sechoka
(1991)
3. Venture capital firms locate Acs,Fhzroy, Lembach&
near large research universities. & Smith (1995 Amrhein
(1987)
4. Umvershy R&D expenditures. Acs,Fitzroy,
along with local economic & Smith
Actors, draw high technology (1995)
Ams to nearby locations.
S. High technology firm’s Herzog &
location decision dommated by Schlottman
presence o f labor force with (1988)
scientific and engineering skills
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CHAPTER IV
THE EMPIRICAL MODELS
Venture capital investment will be examined in two distinct areas. First, the 
decisions made by limited partners (individuals, pension managers, etc.) to place new 
investment funds with independent private firms will be analyzed on a national level. 
Secondly, regional factors such as state corporate tax burdens and government R&D 
expenditures will be investigated for their impact on the location o f venture capital 
investment funds.
Annual New Investment in Venture Capital 
The empirical model used to evaluate annual new investment in venture capital 
firms incorporates variables identified by the existing literature and sununarized in Table 
2 o f the preceding chapter. Specifically, this model incorporates the significant variables 
identified by the Bygrave and Schulman ( 1988) model, but modifies the equation as 
follows:**
•  The actual maximum individual capital gains tax rate is used instead o f a dummy 
variable.
3» Bygrave and Schulman (1988) 334. NEWVC\ = Pi + P2 NASDAQ(-1)\ +- PjD ■ 
P4DNASDAQ(-l)t+B.
31
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•  A dummy variable (ERIS A2) is added to capture the influence o f the change 
in pension fund regulations, which permitted pensions to invest in venture 
capital firms. Bygrave and Schuhnan (1988) and Fenn, Liang, and Prowse 
(1995) cited pension investment relaxation as a major influence on venture 
capital investment
• Two variables reflecting a risk premium, (POSPREM and NEGPREM) are 
included based upon the literature o f Bodie, Kane, and Marcus ( 1989), 
Bygrave and Schulman (1988), and Chan (1983).
After evaluating the movement o f new venture capital investment over time, a  
logarithmic model was chosen for the time series regression.
The general equation constructed for annual new investment in venture capital 
(NEWVC) is:
NEW VC = /(S to ck  m arket prices, capital gains tax rates, 
pension legislation, and risk prem ium s)
In  particular, the m odel can  be rep ressed  as:
Equation I : LNEWVQ = p i + p^LNASDAQ» + P3LCGTRATE, + P4ERISA2 , +
psPOSPREMt + PfiNEGPREMt
”  Ackhtional mocfels were evaluated prior to selecting this model. They included a  semi- 
logarithmic model, a  first differences model, and a  linear model Further, a variable for 
tune was evaluated in all models, as well as a breakpoint variable for the year o f 1980. 
A<klitional interest rates and stock market indexes were evaluated, but omitted due to 
multicollinearity. Also, consumption, new issues o f securities, a n d c h a n ^  in proAs 
were considered.
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where LNEWVQ is the natural log o f new investment flows to independent private firms 
in year t;
LNASDAQt is the natural log o f the year-end closing value for the NASDAQ 
hidex.
LCGTRATEt reflects the natural log o f the maximum long-term capital gains 
tax rate for each year uncter consideration.
ERISA2t is a  dummy variable, capturing the effects o f ERISA legislative 
changes. It is set to zero for 1969 through 1978, and to one for all 
subsequent y%rs. This allows the model to capture the influence 
o f regulatory changes that allowed pensions to invest in venture 
capital.
POSPREMt reflects the difference between the annualized growth rates o f the 
NASDAQ index and annualized Treasury bill returns. It denotes 
the risk premium between “risk-free” Treasuries and riskier equity 
investments. The value is set to the actual difference when 
positive, and to zero otherwise.
NEGPREMt reflects the difference between annualized Treasury bill returns
and the NASDAQ growth rate when the difference is positive. It is 
set to the actual difference when positive, and to zero otherwise. 
This variable is included to capture Wiether venture capital 
investors «chibit a  tymmetrical response to risk premiums.
St is the errorterm  for the régression An assumption o f correct
specffication o f  the model anticipates uxkpendently distributed
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error terms from a normal population, with zero expected value and 
constant variance.®®
The constant term o f the equation. Pi, reflects an autonomous level o f new 
investment in venture capital. The coefficients o f the independent variables are 
expected, a priori, to move in the following directions:
p2 is expected to be positive. Many ofthe companies listed on the NASDAQ
tend to be small capitalized, growth firms that are fi>cused on h i^  
technolo^.®* As Bygrave and Shulman noted, an increase in its closing 
values or IPO volumes could trigger increased investor interest in high 
technolo^ portfolio firms and venture capital investment While the 
NASDAQ index is not viewed as causing venture capital investment, it 
does act as an indicator of demand for investment in small growth 
companies.®*
Ps is expected to have a negative sign. Venture capital investment is
projected to decrease when marginal tax rates on capital gains rise. 
Venture capital is more severely affected by tax rate increases because its
®° Robert S. Pinttyck and Daniel L. Rubinfèld, Econometric Models & Economic 
Forecasts (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991), p. 126.
®* Barron’s Finance and Investment Handbook ed. John Downes and Jordan Elliot 
Goorhnan, (Fourth Edition, Woodbury, New York: Barron’s Educational Series, 1995) 
744.
Bygrave and Shulman (1988), 327.
®* Other securities market indexes were evaluated, including the S&P 500, AMEX, Dow- 
Jones Industrial Average, and the Russell 2000 before final selection o f the NASDAQ
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returns are usually pure capital gains, not dividends.
P4 is expected to be positive, reflecting the relaxation o f regulations
regarding pension fund investment in venture capital.
Ps The direction is unknown. The Nasdaq growth rate was used for the
“high-risk’ return because yearly return data was not available for the 
ventiue capital firms considered in this sturty. The Portfolio Allocation 
model discussed in Appendix A predicts a  positive direction for this 
coefficient®* If the risk premium on small growth companies is positive, 
ceteris paribus, the optimal proportion o f risky holdings in an investor’s 
portfolio would be expected to increase.®® However, ifKasdaq securities 
are viewed as substitutes to venture capital investment, this coefficient 
could take a ne^tive direction.
Ps The direction is also unknown. Again, the Portfolio Allocation model
would predict an increase investment in Treasuries if  their “risk-free” 
return is higher than “risky” returns. However, investors m i^ t substitute 
to investments with medium risk, or their tastes might be such that they 
always choose high-risk investments.
variable as the one that best A  the specifrcatioiL
64 Bygrave and Timmons, Venture Capital at the Crossroads (19921 p. 262.
®* Bodie, Kane, and Nbrcus (1989), pp. 130-140.
®® Considering foe optùnal proportion o f  risky assets is given by y* =  [E (q ,)-r j/ Ao%, 
the expected return on risky assets (rp) incr^ses, other things equal, y* also increases.
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Regional Location o f Venture Capital Funds 
The regional investment model «camines total venture capital resources (both 
new inflows and fund holdings) within fifty states and the District o f Columbia over a  
three-year period fi’om 1993-1995. This pooled cross-section, time series model tests the 
influence o f economic variables identified in Table 3 o f the preceding chapter. While the 
literature did not empirically test for attractors o f venture capital to a region or state, it 
did identify the variables included in this estimation as important to venture capital 
location.
The general equation consriucted for the attraction o f venture capital funds and 
firms (VCFUNDS) to a region or state is:®*
VCFUNDS =/(research and development, corporate tax burdens, average weekly 
earnings, and unemployment rates)
In particular, the functional form o f the regression equation can be expressed as: 
Equation 2: VCFUNDSu = P, + PiRDh + PsCORPTAXu + P4AWEU
+P5UNEMPit+P6Di, + 8it®*
®* Several additional variables identified by the literature were considered, but omitted 
firom the model due to high multicollinearity. Total commercial bank assets by state 
were evaluated as an indicator o f  financial concentration. The number o f advanced 
scientific and engineering degrees awarded by state was also considered as an indicator 
o f a  technically trained labor force. In addition, earnings by industries with high 
technology SIC codes were compiled by state. All o f these variables were highly 
correlated with R&D.
®* Additional functional forms evaluated incluckd a  full logarithmic modeL a  model 
incorporating dummy variables for the years o f 1994 and 1995, and a  model with 
corporate tax dummies set to I for state with corporate income taxes and to zero 
otherwise.
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where VCFUNDS are total venture capital fonds, or the stock o f venture capital, in state i 
during year t; i reflects state 1 -  51, and t reflects year 1 - 3 :
RDit is the dollar amount o f federal Research and Development funding
committed to colleges and universities in state i during year t  
CORPTAXjt is the ratio of corporate tax collections to total state government 
tax collections for state i during year t  It reflects the corporate tax 
burden ofthe state.
AWEit is the average weekly earning in the manufacturing industry for
state i during year t  It reflects the cost of labor.
UNEMPi, is the unemployment rate for state i during year t  It is a  general 
measure o f the economic growth in the state.®’
Dit is a dununy variable for each state and the District o f  Columbia.
Alaska is omitted from the dummy matrix. This variable is 
constructed to consider the intercept for each state.
Sit is the error term for the regressiorr An assumption o f correct
specification of the model anticipates independently distributed 
error terms from a normal population, with zero expected value 
and constant variance.*®
®’ Herzog, Jr. and Schlottman (1991), p. 179 used employment growth as an indicator o f 
the general economic condition o f an MSA The unemployment rate was selected as an 
alternate meastne.
*® PÙKfyck and Rubinfold (1991), p. 224.
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The coefficients o f the incfependent variables, a priori, are expected to have the 
following signs:**
Pz is expected to be positive, reflecting the influence o f university
research and development spending in attracting venture capital. 
The expected direction o f influence is based upon research by 
Leinbach and Amrhein that cited large research universities as 
dominant factors in attracting venture capital resources to a state 
or region.**
p3 is expected to take a  negative direction. Herzog and Schlottman
cited the corporate tax climate as a  location foctor in attracting 
high technology firms to an MSA**. This hypothesis can be 
extended to venture capital fimds, which locate near, and invest in 
high technology firms. As the percentage o f corporate tax 
collections increase, the amount o f  venture capital fimds attracted 
to the state are expected, ceteris paribus, to decrease.
P4 is expected to take a  negative direction. The a  priori direction was
theorized by Acs, FitzRoy, and Smith for the effect o f wages upon 
high technology employment, and is extended to wages effect upon
** These expectations are based upon research cited in this paper by Florida and Kenner 
(1988b); Florida, Smith, and Sechoka (1991); and NGlford B. Green (1991).
** Thomas R. Leinbach and Carl Amrhein, “A Geography o f the Venture Capital hidustry 
in the U. S ” Pmffessionaf Geographer39.2 (1987), p. 150.
** Henry W. Herzog Jr. and Alan M. Schlottman, “Metropolitan Dimensions o f 
Technolo@r Location in  the U. S.: Worker Mobility and Residence Choice,” hidustrv 
Location and Public Policy (1988). on. 169-189.
Reproduced with permission ofthe copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
39
the location o f high technoto^ venture capital funds and firms7‘̂ 
Ps is expected to take a  negative direction. As the unemployment rate
increases, it reflects a  decrease in the general economic condition 
of the state. Venture capital firms or funds, therefore, would not 
be attracted to states with high unemployment rates.
^6 The direction is unknown. The coefBcient will be added to the
estimation’s constant term to determine the intercept for venture 
capital funds within the state. The intercept for Alaska, the 
omitted state, is provided by the constant term of the equation.
Acs, Fhzroy, and Smith (1995), p. 280.
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CHAPTER V
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This section of the paper presents the sources and construction o f the data used 
for the empirical analyses o f  annual new venture capital investment and regional venture 
capital location factors. A discussion o f the sources o f data for both econometric models 
will first be presented Subsequently, procedures used to construct the series will be 
summarized These discussions will be followed by the presentation o f descriptive 
statistics for the data and interpretations.
Sources of the Data
The dependent variable for the annual, new investment flow model is the yearly 
total dollar volume of new investment funds placed with independent private firms 
(NEWVC). Data for this series were obtained from the Venture Economics Annual 
Review: 1996.^̂  Venture Economics Investor Services, a  division o f Securities Data 
Company, compiled the data on this series. This firm  maintains extensive databases on 
venture capital industry statistics based upon voluntary reporting and monitoring o f the 
m arket
Venture Economics hivestor Services, Venture Economics Annual Review: 1996. ed  
Ray Lam (New York: Securities Data Publishing, 1996), p. 2.
40
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The ÙKfependent variable for the National Association o f Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) series is the Nasdaq Composite Index. This index 
originated in 1971. Annual end-of>month, December closing values for this index from 
1971 to 1995 were obtained from The NASDAQ Stock Market Fact Book.^̂  Percentage 
changes in the Nasdaq Composite Index data were used for the POSPREM and 
NEGPREM series.
The source for annualized rates o f return on three-month US Treasury bills is the 
Economic Report o f the President^  The capital-gains tax rate variable (CGTRATE) 
reflects the maximum individual rates on capital gains. These rates were obtained from 
Jane Graveile’s history o f capital gains taxation.^ The dummy variable constructed to 
capture the effects o f Employee Retirement Income Security Act regulatory relaxations 
on investment by pension fimd fiduciaries (ERISA2) is set to zero for years 1969 through 
1978, and to one thereafter. The source for dates on ERISA modifications is the Federal 
Reserve System.^’
The source for the dependent variable ( VCFUNDS) in the regional location o f 
venture capital funds model is Venture Economics Annual Review: 1996.”*
“Monthly Closing Values, Nasdaq Composite Index, 1971-1996,” The 1997 Nasdaq 
Stock Market Fact Book: Historical Data. (Online Version, 
www.nasdacmews.com/about/factbookT o. 2.
Economic Report o f the President 1996 (Washington: Online via US GPO, 
www.access.gpo.gov) Appendix B.
^  Jane G. Gravelle, “History o f Capital Gains Taxation,” The Economic Effects o f 
Taxing Capital Income (Cambridge: MTF Press, 1994), pp. 268-71.
George W. Fenn, Nellie Liang, and Stephen Prowse, The Economics o f the Private 
Equitv Market (Washington: Board o f Governors o f the Federal Reserve System, 1995), 
L 13-14.
Venture Economics hivestor Services, Venture Economics Annual Review: 1996. ed. 
Ray Lam, (New York: Securities Data Publishing, Inc., 1996).
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The source data for the independent variable reflecting annual, federal obligations 
for Research and Development to universities and colleges (RD) were obtained from the 
National Science Foundation.̂ ^ The source for the state corporate tax series data 
(CORPTAX) is the U. S. Bureau o f the Census.^ State government tax collections were 
reported in nominal dollars for fiscal years 1993,1994, and 1995. Source data for the 
Average Weekly Earnings series (AWE) and the unemployment rate series (UNEMP) 
were obtained from the Bureau o f Labor Statistics.^^
Construction o f the Series 
In the model for annual new investment in venture capital, the data series were 
constructed as follows:
NEWVC The data is reported in annual, calendar-year volumes for the
period o f 1969 through 1995. Data were not available on this 
series prior to 1969. The nominal dollar values reflecting annual 
new investment in venture capital in million dollar increments 
were converted to a natural logarithmic form.
NASDAQ This variable reflects a  market capitalization-weighted index
“Federal Obligations for Science and Engineering Research and Development to 
Universiti% and Colleges By State, Institution, and Aeæncv.” Snrvev o f F ie ra i Support 
to Universities. Colleges, and Nonprofit Institutions (Online via National Science 
Foundation/SRS, www.nsf.gov. Fiscal Years 1993-1995), Appendbc B.
^  “State Government Tax Collections, by State: 1993,1994, and 1995,” Statistical 
Abstract o f the United States (Washington. DC: U. S. Bureau o f the Census, 1995,1996, 
and 1997).
^  “Average Weekly Earnings,” State and Area Emplovment. Hours, and Earnings and 
Local Area Unemplovment Statistics. (Online via U. S. Department o f Labor Bureau of 
Labor Statistics Data, www.bls.gov/datahome. 1998).
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covering all Nasdaq common stock, in atWition to foreign stock, 
ADRs and the Nasdaq-lOO.*^ The natural logarithms o f year-end 
index values are used from the year o f the Nasdaq Composite’s 
conception (1971) to 1995.
CGTRATE The natural logarithms o f  the actual maximum individual tax rates 
on capital gains were used in this series.
ERISA2 is a  qualitative, mdependent or dununy variable that takes values 
o f zero or one.
POSPREM To construct this series, first the armual percentage changes in 
Nasdaq index values were calculated Subsequently, the 
armualized percentage yield on three-month Treasury bills^ was 
subtracted from the Nasdaq percentage changes. Then, this 
variable was set to the actual value when the difference was 
positive, and to zero otherwise.
NEGPREM This series was constructed by subtracting the Nasdaq growth rate 
from the annualized yield on three-month Treasury bills. Actual 
positive values were used when they occurred, and the variable 
was set to zero otherwise.
The regional model’s time series and cross-section data were ortkred 
alphabetically by state, and then pooled by year from 1993 through 1995. The variables
** Jefifi^ W. Smith, James P. Selway, m , Lorraine Reilly, and D. Timothy McCormick,” 
NASD Data Relating to  the Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc., and its Listed Companies,” 
NASD Working Paner 97-Ot (Washington. DC: 1999), pp. 28-31.
^  Economic Report o f  the President 1996. Appendix B, Table B071.
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were constructed as follows:
VCFUNDS VCFUNDS reflects total, nominal dollars in million dollar
increments invested with aU venture capital firms located within a 
given state for a given year durmg the period o f 1993 through 
199S.^ It includes both new investment funds from limited 
parmers into venture capital firms, and venture capital funds that 
have been invested into portfolio firms under active management 
by venture capital firms located within the state. Fiffy states and 
the District o f Columbia are considered.
RD Nominal dollar values in million dollar increments for federal
research and development obligations to universities were given by 
state and by year.
CORPTAX Nominal values for state corporate tax collections were ratioed to 
total state tax collections on an armual basis.
AWE The 12-month average for weekly earnings in manufacturing are
given in nominal, unadjusted dollar values.
UNEMP Unemployment rates are expressed as percentiles.
STATE The state dummy variable is set to one for each o f the three years
that observations for that state are included and to zero otherwise.
86 Venture Economic Investor Services (1996), 13.
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Summary Statistics on the Data 
Summary statistics on data used in the annual new investment in venture 
capital model are presented m Table 4.
Table 4. Summary Statistics: Annual New Investment Model
NEWVC NASDAQ CGTRATE ERISA2 POSPREM NEŒ REM
Mean 1725.583 335.433 0.322 0.708 0.107 0.071
Median 1623.500 262.975 0.280 1.000 0.083 0.000
Maxanum 4227.000 1052.13 0.480 1.000 0.500 0.429
Minimum 15.000 59.820 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.000
Std. Dev. 1501.649 261.396 0.102 0.464 0.127 0.130
Expected Sign + - + 7 ?
Only 24 observations are included in the estimation covering the period of 
1972 to 1995 because o f the need for percentage changes in the NASDAQ variable. The 
Nasdaq Index originated in 1971 and thus constrains the number o f observations. The 
average amount of new investment in venture capital over the 24-year period examined is 
$1,726 million with a standard deviation o f $1,502 million. The large range o f the 
NEWVC variable reflects the growth o f investment in venture capital as well as the use 
o f nominal dollar values.
The average value o f the NASDAQ indec over the 24-year period is 
335.43. Its la r^  range reflects the growth in investment in high technology, small- 
capitalized stocks over the period examined. The maximum rate on capital gains taxes 
for individuals (CGTRATE) was 48 percent during the period of evaluation, and the 
minimum rate was 20 percent. Additionally, for 71 percent ofthe years between 1969
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and 1995, regulations were relaxed for investment m venture capital by pension 
fiduciaries (ERISA2).
The average positive premium (POSPREM) for NASDAQ investments 
compared to Treasury bill returns was ten percent during the period o f observation. The 
maximum positive difference for NASDAQ growth rates was 50 percent The average 
positive difference between Treasury bills and NASDAQ when Treasury returns were 
greater (NEGPREM) is 7.1 percent The maximum positive difference for a Treasury bill 
return during the period o f the study is 43 percent
Correlations between the annual new investment variables are presented 
below in Table 5.
Table 5. Annual New Investment Correlation Matrix 
NEWVC NASDAQ CGTRATE ERISA2 POSPREM NEGPREM
NEWVC 1.000
NASDAQ 0.715 1.000
CGTRATE -0.551 -0.405 I.OOO
ERISA2 0.730 0.596 -0.832 1.000
POSPREM -0.066 0.327 -0.068 0.129 I.OOO
NEGPREM -0.143 -0266 0213 -0226 -0.484 1.000
New investment with independent private firms is positively correlated with the 
NASDAQ and ERISA2 variables, which meets the a priori expectations. Also, as 
theorized, NEWVC is negatively correlated with the capital gains tax rate variable. The 
POSPREM variable is negatively correlated with new venture capital investment This 
direction indicates that the NASDAQ stock maricet might act as a substitute for venture 
capital investment, drawing away venture capital dollars Wren its “risk premium is h i ^
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The NEGPREM variable is also negatively correlated with venture capital investment, 
revealing a  potential asymmetry in investor responses. Also, ERISA2 and CGTRATE 
have a strong negative correlation, raising the possibility o f  multicollinearity.
The summary statistics on the data used for empirical tests on the regional 
location o f venture capital fonds are presented in Table 6.
Table 6. Summary Statistics: Regional Investment Model
VCFUNDS RD CORPTAX AWE UNEMP ^TATE
Mean 644.875 226.682 6.312 492.972 5.771 0.020
Median 38.400 138.110 5.600 493.120 5.600 0.000
Maximum 10919.000 1668250 39.160 724240 10.900 I.OOO
Minimum 0.000 9.750 0.000 367.160 2600 0.000
Std. Dev. 1735.884 294.611 4.581 62.790 1.438 0.139
Expected Sign + - - - •>
The average amount o f venture capital fonds across all thirty-five states 
(VCFUNDS) was $645 million between 1993 and 1995. This variable exhibits a  large 
range and a  lai^e standard deviation because o f the concentration of venture capital funds 
in some states, for example, California, Massachusetts, and New York.*’
The average amount o f research and development obligations (RD) to universities 
within a state was $227 million. Again, a large standard deviation and range exists for 
this series due to the concentration o f large, research-oriented universities in some states.
^  Richard Florida, Donald F. Smith, Jr., and Elûcabeth Sechoka, “Regional Patterns o f 
Venture Capital Investment,”  Venture Capital: Intemational Comparisons, ed. Milford B. 
Green (New York: Routledge, 1991). The authors noted the concentration o f venture 
capital funds withm the Northeast and Pacific or West Coast regions.
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The average proportion o f  corporate taxes to total state tax collections 
(CORPTAX) is 6,3 percent, with the maximum proportion being 39 percent for the state 
o f Alaska in 1993 “
The average weekly earnings in manufacturing (AWE) for the SO states and the 
District o f Columbia between 1993 and 1995 were $493. The unemployment rate 
(UNEMP) averaged 5.77 percent across the states during the period o f observatioiL West 
Virginia experienced the highest unemployment rate o f 109 percent in 1993. The lowest 
unemployment rate during the period was 2.6 percent in 1995 in the state o f Nebraska.
The summary statistics for the state dummy (STATE) is the same for each state 
observed. Each o f the 50 states and the District o f Columbia contributed approximately 
two percent o f the observations in the pooled, cross-section data.
Table 7 presents the correlation matrix for the variables in the regional 
estimation.
** “State Government Tax Collections, by State: 1993,1994, and 1995,” Statistical 
Abstract o f  the United States (Washmgton, DC: U. S. Bureau ofthe Census, 1995,1996, 
and 1997).
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VCFUNDS RD CORPTAXl AWE UNEMP AK
VCFUNDS 1.000
RD 0.871 1.000
CORPTAXl 0.171 0.110 1.000
AWE 0.147 0237 0.219 1.000
UNEMP 0281 0.258 0.053 0.114 1.000
AK -0.053 -0.094 0.639 0.051 0.181 1.000
AL -0.053 -0.022 -0.058 -0.104 0.085 -0.020
ARK -0.053 -0.092 -0.023 -0.208 -0.030 -0.020
AZ -0.048 -0.029 -0.023 -0.062 0.016 -0.020
CA 0.720 0.655 0.112 0.045 0.279 -0.020
CO -0.014 0.001 -0.078 0.026 -0.119 -0.020
CT 0.125 0.000 0.118 0.177 0.003 -0.020
DE -0.051 -0.096 0.129 0.195 -0.093 -0.020
DC -0.049 ■0.049 -0.195 0.091 0.276 -0.020
FL -0.022 0.011 -0.040 -0.183 0.059 -0.020
GA -0.039 0.002 -0.004 -0.126 -0.046 -0.020
m -0.053 -0.082 -0.135 -0.040 -0.033 -0.020
lA -0.044 -0.043 -0.056 0.068 -0.201 -0.020
ID -0.053 -0.101 -0.007 -0.058 -0.004 -0.020
IL 0.109 0.097 0.057 0.046 0.036 -0.020
IN -0.046 -0.024 0.101 0.194 -0.076 -0.020
KS -0.052 -0.080 0.017 0.026 -0.086 -0.020
KT -0.053 -0.080 -0.041 -0.017 -0.010 -0.020
LA -0.052 -0.057 -0.023 0.157 0.167 -0.020
MASS 0.311 0272 0.107 0.067 0.033 -0.020
MD 0.065 0.246 -0.068 0.116 -0.030 -0.020
ME -0.051 -0.103 -0.062 -0.021 0.121 -0.020
MI -0.052 0.072 0.219 0.474 0.033 -0.020
MM -0.004 -0.019 0.009 0.059 -0.148 -0.020
MO -0.043 -0.004 -0.059 -0.003 -0.037 -0.020
MS -0.053 -0.086 -0.026 -0234 0.059 -0.020
MT -0.053 -0.097 0.008 0.000 -0.007 -0.020
NC -0.041 0.094 0.034 -0.174 -0.122 -0.020
ND -0.053 -0.098 0.026 -0.154 -0.188 -0.020
NE -0.053 -0.089 -0.030 -0.090 -0.300 -0.020
NH -0.053 -0.079 0.300 0.003 -0.069 -0.020
NJ 0.042 -0.013 0.041 0.139 0.111 -0.020
NM -0.051 -0.060 -0.066 -0.181 0.098 -0.020
NV -0.053 -0.097 -0.195 0.009 0.052 -0.020
NY 0.512 0.369 0.074 0.012 0.121 -0.020
OH -0.011 0.049 -0.045 0289 -0.017 -0.020
OK -0.050 -0.086 -0.082 -0.019 -0.023 -0.020
ORE -0.049 -0.042 0.005 0.008 0.006 -0.020
PA -0.004 0239 0.086 0.052 0.062 -0.020
RI -0.050 -0.081 -0.032 -0.170 0.151 -0.020
SC -0.051 -0.077 -0.049 -0.171 0.056 -0.020
SO -0.053 -0.104 -0.029 -0252 -0247 -0.020
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Table 7, continued
VCFUNDS RD CORPTAXl AWE UNEMP AK
TN -0.035 -0.031 0.040 -0.145 -0.053 -0.020
TX 0.018 0.194 -0.195 -0.028 0.075 -0.020
UT -0.052 -0.046 -0.046 -0.090 -0201 -0.020
VA -0.040 -0.008 -0.063 -0.059 -0.093 -0.020
VT -0.053 -0.092 -0.047 0.005 -0.096 -0.020
WA -0.022 0.042 -0.195 0.216 0.102 -0.020
WI -0.035 0.014 0.011 0.075 -0.139 -0.020
WV -0.053 -0.095 0.037 0.054 0J42 -0.020
WY -0.053 -0.102 -0.195 -0.066 -0.056 -0.020
The amount o f venture capital fonds within a  state (VCFUNDS) is positively and 
highly correlated with the federal research and development obligations to universities 
within the state (RD). The VCFUNDS variable is also positively correlated with the ratio 
o f corporate taxes to total state taxes (CORPTAX), the average weekly earnings in 
manufacturing within a state (AWE), and the unemployment rate (UNEMP) counter to a 
priori expectations. States that exhibit a  positive correlation with venture capital include 
California (72 %), Connecticut (13 %), Illinois (11 %), Nfossachusetts (31%), Maryland 
(7%), New Jersey (4%), New York (51%), and Texas (2%). These positive correlations 
meet the literature’s findings that a  major portion o f U. S. venture capital tends to be 
concentrated in or attracted to the Northeast or to California, with smaller concentrations 
in the Midwest and Texas.*^ All states are correlated with each other at a negative 2 
percent as demonstrated by Alaska (AK).
Richard L. Florida and Martin Kenner, “Venture Capital, High Technolo^, and 
Regional Development” Regional Studies 22.1 (1988), pp. 33-48.
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CHAPTER VI 
Empirical Results
Empirical tests were conducted for both annual new investment in venture capital 
and regional location factors for venture capital funds. Leading this section is a 
presentation o f the results o f the estimation on annual new investment in venture capital. 
Afterward, the results of the regional estimation are discussed.
Armual New Investment in Venture Capital Estimation Results 
The results o f the initial, unrestricted estimation for annual new investment with 
independent, private firms are presented below in Table 8.
51
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Table 8. Annual New Investment Estimation Results
Dependent Variable is LNEWVC
Included observations; 24
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -3.885 1.538 -2.526 0.021
LNASDAQ 1.326 0.272 4.870 0.000
LCGTRATE -1.780 0.657 -2.735 0.014
ERISA2 1.360 0.630 2.160 0.045
POSPREM -2.004 1.112 -1.802 0.088
NEGPREM 0.523 1.112 0.472 0.644
R-squared 0.940 Mean dependent var 6.386
Adjusted R-squared 0.923 ST), dependent var 2.059
S.E. o f r^ e ssfo n 0.572
Sum squared resid 5.893
Log likelihood -17.204 F-statisdc 55.961
Durbm-Watson stat 1.952 Prob(F-statisric) 0.000
The coefficient for the NASDAQ variable is positive and statistically significant, 
suggesting that new investment in venture capital increases when securities market prices 
for high technology stock is increasing. When the NASDAQ index increases by one 
percent, venture capital investments are predicted to increase by 1.33 percent Although 
causality is not inforred, growth in small-capitalized investments during the year is 
predicted to increase investor interest in private entrepreneurial firms backed by venture 
capital. The coefficient for capital gains tax rates (LCGTRATE) is statistically 
significant and negative. This elasticity takes the ap r/o rr direction. The statistically 
signifi«mt coefficient for pension investment changes (ERISA) also takes the ocpected 
direction.
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The variable constructed to reflect a  positive NASDAQ risk premium 
(POSPREM) is statistically significant and negative. It can be interpreted as showing a  
substitution effect between venture capital investments and NASDAQ investments when 
the Nasdaq Index is experiencing h i^  growth. Alternately, the variable constructed to 
reflect positive Treasury premiums (NEGPREM) is statistically insignificant and 
positive. Its positive direction might suggest that investors in venture capital are 
disposed towards riskier investments, and would not consider Treasury bills as substitute. 
Another inference posited by Bygrave and Shulman is that Treasury bill rates represent 
the cost o f debt for entrepreneurs, and as the rate rises, venture capital firms become 
more attractive sources o f financing.’®
The Durbin-Watson statistic was tested for positive autocorrelation.’ ' This test 
failed to reject the null hypothesis of no positive autocorrelatioiL Given that the small 
number o f observations allow only 19 degrees o f freedom, the results o f the estimation 
are not robust”  Additionally, the regression does not account for non-stationary 
properties o f the data. However, the estimation does identify statistically significant 
explanatory variables for investment in venture capital.
^  William D. Bygrave and Joel E. Shulman, “Capital Gains Tax: Bane or Boon for 
Venture Capital?” Frontiers o f Entrepreneurship Research (Wellesley, MA: Babson 
College Entrepreneurship Conference, 1988), pp. 327-335.
For n=24 and k=5, the Du is 1.902 at 5 percent significance. The actual Durbin- 
Watson statistic o f 1.952 fidls between the Du value and 2, yielding a  test result o f no 
significant serial correlatioiL
”  Nfichael Brennan and Thomas Carroll, Quantitative Economics and Econometrics 
(Cincmnati: South-Western PublishmgCo., 1987), p. 365.
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Regional Venture Capital Estimation Results 
The results o f the estimation for regional influences on total venture capital 
resources are presented in Table 9. A White Heteroskedasticify-Consistent estimation 
was performed because non-constant variance was a concern due to large differences in 
the magnitudes o f variables between states. ”
Table 9. Regional Venture Capital Estimation Results
Dépendait Variable is VCFUNDS 
Included observations: 153
White Ifeteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C ** 1732.196 870.684 1.989 0.049
RD** 8.088 2.654 3.048 0.003
CORPTAXl -1.280 4.128 -0210 0.757
AW E* -3.038 1.579 -1.924 0.057
UNEMP* -50.972 26.156 -1.949 0.054
A L* -1487.790 516.732 -2.879 0.005
ARK** -518.978 244242 -2.125 0.036
AZ** -1298.434 459.415 -1826 0.006
CA -3100.720 3812.685 -0.813 0.418
CO** -1346.356 598.502 -2250 0.027
CT 653.948 493234 1226 0.188
DC** -634.707 281.489 -2255 0.026
DE 84.112 131.515 0.640 0.524
FL** -1795.824 738.417 -1432 0.017
GA** -1828235 668265 -1735 0.007
H I** -471.755 199.586 -1364 0.020
lA ** -951.612 343.845 -1768 0.007
ID -148.659 131.823 -1.128 0.262
IL -1336.777 1084258 -1232 0221
IN -1056210 364.431 -1898 0.005
K S * -430.707 172.485 -1497 0.014
K T** -457.590 183236 -1493 0.014
LA** -498.989 201269 -2.478 0.015
MASS -1768228 2041.784 -0.866 0.389
M D** A 2U .n o 1897.709 -2273 0.025
ME 10.485 103285 O.IOI 0.919
M I** -2309.879 756.717 -3.053 0.003
M N * -857287 464.706 -1.845 0.068
93 Herbert White, “A Heteroskedasticify-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a 
Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity,”  Econometrica 48 (May 1980), pp. 817-838.
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Table 9, contmued
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
M O ** -1602.384 577.083 -2.777 0.007
M S** -6I2.% 9 274212 -2235 0.028
MT -134.416 118.812 -1.131 0.261
N C** -3495.493 1200.538 -2512 0.005
N D * -415.153 216.439 -1.918 0.058
N E** -548.853 237.323 -2.313 0.023
NH ** -451.517 161.029 -2.804 0.006
N I -138.935 431.535 -0.322 0.748
NM ** -931.784 363.212 -2.565 0.012
NV -105.682 127.712 -0.828 0.410
NY -982.208 2823.237 -0.348 0.729
OH** -1704.835 720.396 -2.367 0.020
O K * -323.760 165.491 -1.956 0.053
ORE** -1008.101 358.934 -2.809 0.006
PA ** -5080.128 1859.393 -2.732 0.008
R I** -513.108 241.673 -2.123 0.036
SC** -663.586 282.819 -2.346 0.021
SD * ■481.569 268.066 -1.796 0.076
TN ** -1254.506 498.033 -2.519 0.013
TX ** -4162.184 1658.109 -2.510 0.014
U T** -1210.668 411.347 -2.943 0.004
V A ** -1602.083 581.317 -2.756 0.007
V T* -261.713 146.947 -1.781 0.078
W A** -1771264 718.482 -2.465 0.015
W I** -1762.015 635.716 -2.772 0.007
WV 86.186 91.954 0.937 0.351
WY -171264 158.342 -1.082 0.282
* p < 0 .1 0
R-squared 
Adjusted R- 
squared 
S .E .o f
♦*p<0.05
0.990
0.984
219.795
* * * p <  0.001
Mean dependent var 644.875
regression 
Sum squared 4734367.000 SD . dependent var 1735.884
resid
Log -1008.102 F-statistic 173.757
likelihood
Durbm- 2.003 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
W atson stat
The coefficient for federal Research and Development obligations to universities 
in a  state (RD) takes the expected positive Erection and is statistically significant at 98
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percent For every million federal R&D dollars obligated to a  state university, ceteris 
pembusy state venture capital funds are predicted to increase by approximately 8 .1 
million dollars. However, the coefficient for the proportion o f  corporate taxes to overall 
state taxes (CORPTAXl), while taking the expected direction, is statistically 
insignificant
The average weekly earnings’ coefficient (AWE) takes the expected negative 
direction, and is statistically significant All else equal, venture capital funds in a  state 
are predicted to decrease by S3.04 million for every dollar increase in a state’s average 
weekly earnings in manufacturing. Likewise, the unemployment rate coefficient 
(UNEMP) is statistically significant takes an a priori negative directioiL A one-percent 
increase in a  state’s unemployment rate is predicted to decrease venture fund location in 
that state by approximately 51 million dollars, ceteris paribus. Finally, the coefficients 
on many o f the state dummy variables are statistically significant and negative.
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CHAPTER Vn
CONCLUSION
This study has examined the venture capital industry from a national and a 
regional perspective. Empirical models were constructed to evaluate national investment 
in venture capital and the location o f  funds. The study has identified statistically 
significant, explanatory variables for new venture capital investment and the location o f 
venture capital funds. For new investment in venture capital, these variables include the 
NASDAQ Index, pension fimd legislation, capital gains tax rates, and risk premiums.
The statistically significant variables for regional location of venture capital fimds 
include university research and development funding, average weekly earnings, and the 
unemployment rate.
A positive elasticity o f 1.326 was found between new investment in venture 
capital and the NASDAQ indec Bygrave and Schulman (1988) also found a statistically 
significant, positive relation between venture capital investment and the NASDAQ index. 
This folding indicates that rising investments in NASDAQ, or public markets that carry 
small-capitalized, high technolo^ firms, may predict increased interest in small, high 
technology venture capital firms. However, the results do not ùnply causality between 
NASDAQ and venture capital investment. The purpose o f the stu<ty was not to 
investigate the causal relationship between venture capital and the NASDAQ index, but
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to extend upon prior research o f the economic conditions that impact venture capital 
investment
The relaxation o f pension fiduciary rules, allowing pension fimds to invest in 
venture capital was also found to have a positive effect on new venture capital 
investment In contrast to previous research, capital gains tax rate increases were found 
to have a  significant, negative influence on new investment in venture capital. Likewise, 
when the NASDAQ Index growth rate exceeded Treasury bill returns, providing a risk 
premium, new investment in venture capital was found to decline.
On a state or regional level, this stutty found that venture capital fimds were 
attracted to states with higher levels o f university research and development fimding. 
Additionally, the study identified unemployment rates and average weekly earnings as 
negative influences on venture capital fimd location.
The results o f this study suggest that proposed policy changes on capital gains tax 
rates or investmem regulation should incorporate an analysis o f the legislation’s effect on 
venture capital investment Legislative changes that reduce venture capital investment 
could lead to a decrease in our nation’s economic growth. Also, the study suggests that 
states seeking to attract high technology firms should evaluate the level o f research and 
development conducted at universities within the state.
The objective o f this stucty was to further identify the variables that impact new 
investment in venture capital, and to determine what regional or state variables 
influenced the location o f venture capital funds. The analysis revealed significant 
variables that impact venture capital investment. However, the model on national 
investment contained only 24 armual observations, and therefore, is not statistically
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robust As this industry matures, and more data become available, future studies will be 
able to identify the variables that affect venture capital investment with greater 
confidence. The venture capital industry has contributed to economic growth in America 
by funding some o f America’s leading entrepreneurs. And, as Benjamin Mokry said, 
“The entrepreneur has become somethmg o f a  talisman and symbol o f hope for the 
American economy as it moves into the twenty-first century.”’*
94 Benjamin Mokry, Entrepreneurship and Public Policy: Can Government Stimulate 
Business Startups? (Westport. CT: Greenwood Press, 1988) p. 2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
APPENDIX A
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In their study ofthe private equity maricet, including venture capital, Fenn, Liang, 
and Prowse suggested that limited information about private transactions had worked to 
depress the development of academic literature in this area.”  By grave and Timmons 
also cited the lack o f conceptual models for venture capital flows when designing an 
empirical study.”
However, economic and financial theories have been developed on investment 
and economic growth. In his evaluation o f economic growth, Abramovitz noted “die 
process o f capital formation involves three distinct, if  interdependent activities:””  
saving, finance, and investment And, investment theory can be applied to venture 
capital investment and the variables that influence i t
Venture Capital Firms and Financial Intermediation 
When considering investment theory, venture capital firms can be viewed as 
financial intermediaries, providing investors (limited partners) with
”  Fenn, L ian^ and Prowse (1995) 3.
”  Bygrave and Tunmons, “A nBnpirical Model”  (1985) 106.
”  Moses Abramovitz, Capital Formation and Economic Growth: A NBER Conference 
Report (Chicago: UhwersityofChic%o Press, 1955) p. 4.
60
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infonnational and monitoring services on portfolio firms (entrepreneurs).”  As financial 
intermediaries, venture capital firms may serve to reduce information or search costs for 
investors in a  market characterized by asymmetric information. Additionally, venture 
capital firms, as financial intermediaries, may reduce the risk o f asset ownership for 
private investors through “transformation” o f the assets by spreading ownership across a 
number o f portfolio firms.”
However, even with venture capitalists acting as financial intermediaries, an 
investment in a small, entrepreneurial firm entails a  higher degree o f risk on return than 
investment in less volatile assets such as Treasuries. Therefore, investors in high-risk 
venture capital equities, require a premium on the asset’s return in order to compensate 
them for the additional risk. This risk premium is detailed in the financial model of 
investment theory developed by Bodie, Kane, and Marcus. '®®
Portfolio Allocation Model 
The Bodie, Kane, and Marcus model for portfolio allocation considers a  risk- 
neutral investor. If investors are assumed to be risk neutral, a  risk premium or 
extended return is placed upon assets with highly variable returns. For example, a 
diversified portfolio might hold a proportion (y) o f its investment fimds m risky assets.
”  Chan, Yuk-Shee, “On the Positwe Role o f Financial fotermediation in Allocation of 
Venture Capital in a  Market with Imperfect hiformation,” The Journal O f Finance 38.5 
(December 1983), pp. 1543-1568.
”  Hester, Donald D., “On the Theory o f Financial Intermediation,” De Economist 142.2 
(1994), p. 134.
Bodie, Kane, and Marcus. Investments (1989), pp. 130-140.
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and the remaining proportion (1 - y) in risk-free instruments, such as three-month 
treasury bills. If the risk-free return is denoted by rr and the risky rate o f return denoted 
by rp, the authors define the return on the complete portfolio (rc) as:'”  
re = yrp + (l-y)T f 
and the expected rate o f return as:
E(rc) = yE(rp) + ( l -y ) r r  
= rf + y[E(rp) - r j
The risk premium of the risky asset is, therefore, E(r^) - rf. Additionally, if  the 
investor’s utility (U) for the portfolio is defined as a positive function of the rate o f 
return, a negative function of the variance (a^) in return, and a  negative function o f  a 
coefficient o f risk aversion (A), then utility is maximized by the following function:
Max U = E(rJ - l/2AcTc = ff + y[E(rp) - r j -  l/2y^A(Tp 
where the standard deviation o f the portfolio is:'®’
and the variance o f the portfolio is:
(Tc = r(rp
Setting the first derivative of the maximization equation to zero and solving for y yields 
the optimal proportion of rislty assets an investor would hold in a  portfolio: 
y* = [E(rp)-r£l/ACT’p 
Therefore, the optimal amount o f risky assets held in a  portfolio decreases in 
proportion to the level o f risk aversion and the degree o f variance in returns. Alternately,
'®' Bodie, Kane, and Marcus (1989) 130-140.
'®̂  Bodie, Kane, and Marcus ̂ 989) 167.
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it increases in proportion to the level o f the risk premium. Venture capital investment is 
characterized by a  high (kgree o f risk, and therefore, must offer a high-expected risk 
premium.
Bygrave and Timmons remarked upon unrealistic venture-capital investor 
expectations o f returns approaching 50 percent annually.'®* ThQr cited a stucty which 
highlighted the relationship between high expected returns and high risk, saying, “Just 
6.8% o f the 383 investments made in portfolio companies between 1969 and 1985 
returned ten times or more on invested capital. And more than 60% o f all these 
investments either lost money or failed to exceed savings account rates o f return.” '®̂
This section first reviewed the role o f venture capital firms as financial 
intermediaries. It noted that venture capital firms might reduce search costs and help to 
balance asymmetric information between investors and portfolio firms. Risk o f asset 
ownership is also reduced because the venture capital firm spreads the investor’s fimds 
into equity positions across a number o f portfolio firms.
Subsequently, the portfolio allocation model was reviewed. This model 
examined the composition of an investment portfolio composed o f risk-fiee and rislty 
assets. '®® After defining a  utility-maximization function, the optimal amount o f risky 
assets held in an investment portfolio was defined as a  function o f the investor’s risk 
aversion, the variance in the asset’s return, and the level o f the risk premium offered on 
the risky asset
'®’ Bodie, Kane, and Marcus (1989) 172.
'®* Bygrave and Timmons (1992) 9.
Bygrave and Timmons (1992) 9.
Bodie, Kane, and Marcus (1989) 130-140.
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